Locking Down Syria

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Even before the ceasefire in Syria collapsed, Russia was already making preparations to reinforce its military contingent in Syria. Since the ceasefire’s premature end and the withdrawal of the US from bilateral talks on the Syrian conflict, Moscow has cast subtlety aside and is moving forward in Syria with little regard for the objections of the US government. Public and social media statements by members of the Russian government this week resembled taunts and with the general state of US-Russian relations rapidly deteriorating, it probably will not improve anytime in the near future.

Russia is moving additional forces and supplies to Syria. Additional Russian Navy warships have been seen transiting the Bosphorus on their way to the East Med, and another advanced SAM system is on its way to Syria. This one is the SA-23 Gladiator/Giant, known as the S-300VM in Russian military circles. It is an updated version of the SA-21 Growler (S-400) system that arrived in Syria last year. The Gladiator was designed to defend against and defeat theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and is also very effective against precision-guided munitions and perhaps even standoff jammers such as the US Navy’s EA-18 Growler.

On the surface it might seem the movement of additional advanced SAMs into Syria is textbook example of sabre rattling. That might be Moscow’s intent. However, the operational implications cannot be overlooked or ignored. With the incoming SA-23s, and the SA-21s and fighters already in place, Russia has the foundation for a very effective no-fly zone at its fingertips. At any given moment, Russia can choose to close off the skies of Syria to all aircraft except for its own and those of its Syrian allies. Such a no-fly zone would be invaluable in the event of a Syrian offensive against rebel groups around Aleppo or other parts of the nation. The US had made noise about targeting Syrian government forces and airbases with airstrikes to help alleviate the crisis in Aleppo. The presence of a potential Russian-enforced no-fly zone essentially kills the possibility of US/coalition airstrikes against government targets.

In a nutshell, what Russia is doing right now is locking down Syria tight. Moscow has gained control of the geopolitical and military situation in the country. Washington’s position in Syria has been largely minimized, due in large part to the mismanagement of the administration and the naïve, pie-in-the-sky expectations that Secretary of State John Kerry and President Obama adopted when Russia intervened in the conflict last year. Back in September of 2015 it was obvious that Russia was not interested in a partnership with the US either to stabilize Syria and/or combat ISIS. Putin sent Russian forces to Syria to ensure the survival and eventual victory of Bashir al-Assad’s regime. Yet Obama and Kerry still went forward in the belief that Syria could be stabilized through US-Russian cooperation. The chances of that happening have evaporated, leaving Washington with two choices: do nothing further or respond to the Aleppo situation with airstrikes and run the risk of escalation and a wider conflict with Russia.

 

9 November, 2015 Update: Russia To Sell SAMs To Iran

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With international sanctions on Iran now lifted, it was a matter of time before Russia and Iran came to terms on a new contract for SA-10 (S-300) surface to air missiles. A contract worth $800 million  had been signed by the two nations in 2007 but Russia froze it in 2010 after sanctions were applied to Iran. It is not yet clear which variant of the SA-10 that Iran will purchase. For months the US, Israel and the Gulf States have been worried that the lifting of sanctions against Iran would trigger a massive re-armament program by Tehran. It appears that the first phase is underway now.

The aforementioned nations are also alarmed by the quality of the weapons systems that Iran is beginning to purchase. Iranian and Russian officials have downplayed the SA-10 sale, stating that the system is defensive in nature and cannot be used to threaten other nations in the region. On the surface, this is somewhat correct. SAMs are not offensive weapons per se, but the newer variants of the SA-10 have extended ranges. If Iran decided to position SA-10 batteries close to its coastline it could effectively shut down the airspace over the Persian Gulf, and sections of the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia has asked Russia more than once to shelve the deal with no success.

For the United States and Israel, the SA-10 purchase presents a unique dilemma. Iran is quite likely bolstering its air defenses to deter possible air strikes against its nuclear facilities should the nuclear deal fall apart. If that day ever comes, US or Israeli aircrews will have to fight their way past an increasingly effective and modern integrated air defense system in order to reach their targets.

*Note-I originally planned to post the first part of First Strike tonight, followed by this update tomorrow. At the last minute I decided to change the order. First Strike will be posted tomorrow evening*