
As expected, the China war prognostication talk ramped up over the weekend following a memo released on Friday by Air Mobility Command’s commanding general urging his officers to prepare for a war against China in the near future. Now on Monday morning, some US politicians are coming out in support of the AMC memo while the first signs of Chinese discontent are appearing on pro-China internet news sites. Recently, a handful of former and current US general officers have publicly warned that China appears to be moving nearer to using its military power against Taiwan and perhaps in other areas of the Western Pacific as well. It remains to be seen if these warnings will assimilate into a wakeup call for the United States or if they will go unheeded.
Realistically speaking, the prospect of a military conflict between the United States and China continues to rise with every passing week. Although the US has been preparing for a potential war with China in the Western Pacific, the arrangements have so far lacked a unifying element comparable to what was found in US military doctrines during the later years of the Cold War. Specifically, I’m referring to the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy and the combined US Army/USAF Airland Battle 2000. From the start these doctrines identified the Soviet Union as the adversary in the North Atlantic and in Western Europe respectively. Ten years ago, US attempts to fashion a doctrine for wartime operations in the Western Pacific created AirSea Battle, a combined US Navy/USAF plan to counter China’s increasing anti-access/area deniability. AirSea Battle evolved into JAM GC, the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. JAM GC was intended to build upon the foundation of AirSea and finalize a doctrine for conducting operations against determined, capable, and elusive opponents who avoid U.S. strengths, emulate U.S. capabilities, attack vulnerabilities, and expand operations beyond physical battlegrounds.
Despite all the work done on AirSea Battle and its successor concept, the US has little to show for it at present in terms of an effective warfighting doctrine for a conflict against an increasingly aggressive and militarily capable China in the Western Pacific. In the absence of such a formal doctrine, the services have developed their own concepts, ostensibly for incorporation into JAM GC. However, it is unclear if the concepts will connect successfully and produce a war plan that will bring success in a future Sino-US war. Time is not on the side of the United States in this regard. With Ukraine still dominating attention, the prospect of the United States not being prepared to counter a Chinese attack against Taiwan remains real. General Minihan predicts such an attack will come around 2025. But it could also come sooner and if so, the US will not be as ready as it needs to be.