

History never repeats, as Mark Twain once said, but it does often rhyme. Even more significant, history can offer crumbs and clues about what the future may hold. Provided an observer is adept enough to separate the wheat from the chaff and draw the proper conclusion. I cannot help but look at the current Sino-US relationship and draw a comparison to Japan-US relations in the spring or summer of 1941. The parallels are there for certain. From an ascendant Asian naval power to a distracted US government and population either unable or unwilling to read the writing on the wall.
In the spring of 1941, the world was at war. Germany had conquered most of continental Europe and had new offensives underway in Yugoslavia and Greece. Preparations were also underway for the invasion of the Soviet Union which would commence in June, 1941. In Southeast Asia, Germany’s successes in Europe prompted Japan to put pressure on European governments. The Dutch agreed to provide Japan with oil from the Dutch East Indies, but nowhere near the amount Japan needed. When Japan sent large numbers of troops into Indochina and threatened British, French and Dutch territories in the Far East, Western nations retaliated with economic sanctions. Namely an oil embargo. Negotiations between the US and Japan to ease the strain on their relations continued on, but were going nowhere. Although US, British and Dutch officials were discussing plans for a joint defense of their Pacific territories, the US and its service branches were not making serious preparations for war. The Japanese, on the other hand, were.
The state of the US Navy by summer of 1941 was regrettable. The Pacific Fleet was making plans to fight a naval war in the Pacific centered on the fleet’s battleships, not its aircraft carriers. It was clear by this point, however, that the future of naval warfare would revolve around the carrier and not the battleship. US doctrine being developed at the time supported this and at the Naval War College in Newport, officers were developing the tactics and training to fight this new carrier war. It is useful to remember, though, that even though the NWC had the correct idea about how naval warfare would pan out in the coming war, the US Navy was hardly prepared in summer of 1941 to take on the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Fast forward to the present day. China has assumed the role of ascendant Asian power and its navy is reaping the benefits. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is now the largest navy in the world. Shipbuilding is nothing short of a national priority. Every month new warships join the fleet in ever-increasing numbers. Curiously, China’s naval ascent has not raised alarms within the US Navy or the United States government. A sense of complacency seems to have settled over Washington. US military leaders and politicians are convinced the qualitative edge of the US Navy will be more than sufficient to neutralize China’s quantitative advantage in the event of a war in the Western Pacific. Therefore, US admirals and politicians continue to wage budget battles and strive to lay the groundwork for less-than-substantial naval buildup and modernization that may not be completed before the shooting starts.
Author’s Note: This was the introductory post of a 2-3 part series on the US Navy’s preparations ..or lack thereof…to fight and win a potential naval war against China in the next 5-10 years. The next entry will be posted on Easter Monday.