Xi Leaves Moscow

Xi Jinping has left Moscow, bringing an end to a visit which was watched closely from Kiev to Washington. Surprisingly, there appears to be a growing consensus in some media and geopolitical circles that the Xi-Putin meetings will not result in in concrete changes to the Sino-Russian relationship, or China’s position regarding the war in Ukraine. Based on public statements and the slivers of information emanating from behind closed doors these thoughts are nothing beyond the obvious. The real decisions were made behind closed doors between Monday and Thursday and just what they were will only become clear as time goes on.

First off, the strategic relationship between China and Russia is almost certainly now solidified in a junior-senior partner dynamic. As the senior partner, it is in Beijing’s best interests to keep Russia afloat in the war for an extended period of time. Or, as an alternative, press for peace talks resulting in a short-term ceasefire at the very least. China’s peace plan is very popular in the Kremlin but has hardly gained a second look in Kiev or the West. To be blunt, the plan is anything but fair and if agreed to by all parties and implemented, would see Russia keep possession of the territory it has gained so far in the war. Should Ukraine and the West formally reject China’s attempt at playing peacemaker, this opens the door for China to supply Russia with military equipment and material.

More disconcerting, it will also pave the way for China to start laying the foundation for its own geopolitical and military moves in the Western Pacific and beyond.

Author’s Note: Short post today. Free time slipped away a bit. I’m considering starting up a substack for DIRT to have a place where I can post in-depth analysis, while keeping this blog mostly for shorter briefs and updates. I’ll be sure to keep readers in the loop. –Mike  

Xi Jinping Set To Arrive In Moscow On Monday

Xi Jinping is set to arrive in Moscow on Monday with the weight of China’s foreign policy ambitions weighing on his shoulders. The visit to Russia comes as the war in Ukraine continues on with no end in sight, the International Criminal Court has announced it intends to put Vladimir Putin on trial for alleged war crimes and China is ambitiously seeking to expand its global role. Should Xi play his cards right, he could walk away from Moscow on Wednesday in a strong position to influence and perhaps bring about an acceptable end to the war. Acceptable to China and Russia that is.

Russian officials have voiced hope that Xi’s visit will result in new approaches to the war being found.  Putin’s foreign policy adviser, Yuri Ushakov said, “I’m sure that our leader and the Chinese leader will exchange their assessments of the situation. We shall see what ideas will emerge after that.” China’s proposal for a ceasefire and negotiations was warmly received in Moscow last month. Ukraine welcomed China’s involvement but went no farther.

It could be difficult if not impossible to ignore China’s growing presence and influence, however. After successfully brokering a restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Xi is looking to position China to play a greater role in managing global affairs. It would not come as a shock if Xi laid out a new ceasefire proposal while in Moscow or offered to mediate talks between the Russian and Ukrainian governments aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement to the war. China playing the part of peacemaker is in contradiction to its position on territorial integrity. Specifically, concerning Taiwan. The Taiwan matter could prevent any future Chinese peace proposals from being taken seriously by Kiev or the West.

Ukraine Update 8 March, 2023: The End Approaching In Bakhmut?

The end might be approaching for Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut. Maybe. It depends on whose statements and reports you choose to agree with. The Russians and their Wagner Group mercenaries claim to have made tremendous gains and are on the verge of encircling the city. Despite the encouraging tone and content of Russian statements, the fighting continues.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government’s position on Bakhmut is undergoing a revision. Volodymir Zelenskiy has promised Ukrainian troops will continue fighting on in Bakhmut. By continuing to hold the city, he explained in an interview yesterday, it denies Russia from being able to claim a symbolic victory, as well preventing Russian forces from capturing Bakhmut and using it as a jump-off point for future operations in the east. As for the city’s value to Ukraine and its military, at this time it is representational. Ukrainian forces have prepared hardened defensive lines to the west in anticipation of the future Russian axis of advance. The danger right now for Ukrainian forces in and around Bakhmut is time. The longer they remain in place, the greater the chances of their eventual encirclement becomes.  Nevertheless, Zelenskiy and his military commanders met earlier in the week and decided Bakhmut will continue to be defended.

NATO is preparing for the possible fall of Bakhmut as well. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg admitted today that the city could be in Russian hands within a matter of days. However, Stoltenberg was also careful to point out that should Bakhmut fall it will not represent a turning point in the war or swing momentum back to the Russian side.

Ukraine Update: 10 February, 2023

As fighting intensifies on the eastern front, Volodymyr Zelinskiy was wrapping up his second trip abroad since the war with Russia commenced almost one year ago. The Ukrainian leader’s final stop was Brussels where he gave hearty gratitude for the European Union’s assistance since February, 2022. Zelenskiy’s sincere thank you was followed by requests for even more support in the coming weeks and months. In a meeting attended by all twenty-seven leaders of EU member-states, Zelenskiy specifically asked for financial aid to help cover rebuilding costs once the war draws to an end. He also pressed for the EU to accelerate Ukraine’s bid for membership, speaking of his nation’s desire to live freely in a united Europe. In conclusion, Zelenskiy informed the gathering of leaders that Ukrainian intelligence services had discovered “a detailed Russian plan to undermine the political situation in Moldova.”

How accurate this claim is remains to be seen. Yet the timing and location of its disclosure, along with Zelenskiy’s renewed requests for a continued steady flow of financial and military aid could indicate growing anxiety in Kiev over the state of the Ukrainian armed forces as well as the direction the war could go in come early spring. It goes without saying that the Ukrainian military has absorbed heavy casualties and material losses over twelve months of war. According to recent reports from sources inside Ukraine, shortages of small arms ammunition and artillery rounds are especially acute. More alarming is the small number of serviceable main battle tanks remaining in action on the eastern front. Some tanks and other armored vehicles are obviously being held in reserve, yet the whirlwind campaign by Zelenskiy and some Western leaders to persuade Germany to unlock access to its Leopard 2 MBTs and older tanks presently in storage amplifies the Ukrainian need for tanks as a major Russian offensive in the spring appears more likely with each passing day.

By hinting about possible Russian action in Moldova, Zelenskiy is deliberately playing on the European fear that Vladimir Putin truly has designs on European territory and sovereign nation-states beyond Ukraine. Europe waking up to this realization will assure another tidal wave of money and weapons for his beleaguered country and its defenders, Ukraine’s leader is wagering. He is no fool and in his estimation the move will conceivably reap large rewards as Ukraine’s military leaders warn of decisive battles being waged in the coming months.

In the Shadow of Escalation

Germany’s reversal on its decision to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, and the Biden administration’s follow up announcement that the US will also ship a contingent of M-1 Abrams tanks has raised eyebrows and caused concern across the globe. NATO sending armor to the Ukraine has been considered a red line since the start of the war in Ukraine almost a year ago. The fear was that such a move is almost certain to bring with it a substantial risk of escalation. That concern proved to be a  main reason Berlin was initially reluctant to make its Leopard 2 tanks available to Kiev.  But in the face of allied pressure and a changing dynamic on the ground in Ukraine, Germany decided providing Leopard 2s was worth the perceived risk. Great Britain drew the same conclusion a few days earlier and the United States has followed suit. The events going on over the last thirty-six hours make it clear NATO’s strategy for Ukraine is shifting to an ‘escalate to deescalate’ track. The problem with this is that Russia appears to be doing much of the same.

With winter having transformed the fighting in Ukraine into a stalemate, Russia is digging in and making preparations for a spring offensive. Which means that between now and spring, Russia and NATO will be racing to make their respective arrangements. For NATO this means getting Ukrainian tank crews trained to proficiency and the new armor integrated into Ukrainian units in time to help blunt the coming Russian offensive. Russia, on the other hand, will be rushing to get its dispositions and resupply efforts complete in time to launch the offensive on its terms and seize the initiative.

Between now and spring, the conflict will enter the shadow of escalation. Essentially, this is a critical stage where perception and misperception of the opposing side’s intentions and strategic objectives will determine the next direction the war will take. As we’ve seen many times over the past eleven months, the behavior of Russia has not been as centralized, coordinated or planned as the West anticipated. The imposing of heavy economic sanctions failed to deter Putin from pressing forward with the invasion. Even larger batches of Western military and economic aid earmarked for Kiev also did not convince him that war was a bad idea. Putin and Russia have not responded as anticipated. The West misperceived Putin and the effect its actions would have.

In turn, Putin’s misperceptions of the West, predominantly of NATO and the United States, contributed greatly to the less-than-attractive position the Russians are presently in. The overall unity NATO has demonstrated in the face of Soviet aggression has transcended all pre-war predictions. Ukraine’s performance on the battlefield helped to keep the alliance from writing off Kiev as a lost cause. Putin and Russian military leaders also grossly underestimated how well the military would fight, a near fatal misperception of Russian power and one which continues to haunt Russia on a regular basis.

In the shadow of escalation phase watch for the West and Russia to try and reassess their perceptions of the other’s intentions and behavior. For Russia, NATO’s commitment to send armor to Ukraine has served to fulfill Putin’s argument that NATO is an active combatant in the war. This could give him some relief on the domestic front with a resurgence of popular support, rendering the burgeoning anti-Putin faction in the Russian government stillborn. The West, in turn, needs to prioritize determining Putin’s most probable courses of action in the event the offensive comes up short of its objectives. More to the point, how might Putin respond if the newly arrived armor from Germany, the United States and Great Britain plays a key role in blunting his spring offensive?